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Abstract 
It is widely established that economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects investment decisions and 
performance, yet research in this area has overlooked the direct property investment market. This 
paper seeks to rectify this and proposes a multi-stage multi-level analytical framework to offer new 
insights and a richness of findings. Using a news-based measure of EPU in the UK, and controlling 
for economic conditions, a national level analysis reveals some evidence of Granger Causality 
between EPU and total returns, indicating that pricing is responsive to uncertainty. These findings 
suggest that EPU is an important risk factor for direct property investments, with pricing 
implications. Differences in data and performance measure are important, however, with income 
returns unresponsive. A micro-level investigation begins to reveal some of the asset-pricing 
decisions underpinning the national results, indicating investors’ concerns for income streams are 
consistently high, regardless of varying EPU. Pricing can also cause changes in EPU, such as in the 
retail and industrial markets (increasingly linked through logistics) reflecting sector-specific 
stakeholder groups and newsworthy issues. This evidence highlights how important it is for policy-
makers to understand the complex and bi-directional relationship, that indecision can undermine 
investment confidence and cause investment market volatility, in turn raising EPU.  
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2 
Investment decision-making under economic policy uncertainty 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) relates to uncertainty in the fiscal, regulatory and monetary 
framework of a country that can be generated by an unexpected policy shift, surprise election 
outcome or ambiguity stemming from the emergence of a major political debate. It is a class of 
economic risk where the future path of government policy on monetary or fiscal issues, taxation, 
expenditure or regulatory regime is ambiguous and unpredictable and, like other sources of risk 
and uncertainty, can generate volatility in economic and financial systems as market agents adapt 
their expectations and behaviours. The small, but growing body of evidence on the effects of EPU 
shows that sudden and significant shocks to economic and political policy lead to fluctuations in 
economic activity and disturbances which are felt directly within the general economy and across 
financial markets. The majority of this evidence has focused on the impacts on the behaviour of 
firms and, more widely, on economic activity at the aggregated level (for example, Hassett and 
Metcalf, 1999; Fernández-Villaverde et al., 2015) with only a small number of studies looking at 
effects within the financial sector.  
Pastor and Veronesi (2013) highlight the absence of mainstream finance literature investigating 
asset price effects, and explore illustrative examples, such as Standard & Poor’s downgrading of the 
US credit rating due to a rise in political uncertainty. Through this they develop a general 
equilibrium model to examine the impact of EPU on stock prices, and find evidence that stock 
prices are responsive to political news and heightened uncertainty around government policy 
direction that can lead to greater asset price volatility that cannot be fully explained by economic 
conditions alone. Additionally, they find higher correlations in stock prices during periods of higher 
EPU, supporting the argument that uncertainty stemming from the economic policy of 
governments tends to be universal across investment markets and results in market-wide, non-
diversifiable effects which raise the total risk carried by nation-bounded investment portfolios 
(Brogaard and Detzel, 2015).   
Property investors make decisions based on their expectations of how assets will perform within 
the future economic policy environment. Uncertainty will always exist regarding the predictability 
of the future but heightened uncertainty around a country’s future institutional framework can 
lead to a rise in risk premia, which in turn impacts directly on the pricing of assets and investment 
decisions (Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). Yet, the direct property investment market has largely been 
over-looked in the EPU literature with only a small number of published studies looking at how 
house prices respond to political news. An understanding of this market is essential to all 
stakeholders involved, especially fund managers who can better hedge the effects of price volatility 
on their funds, and those with policy responsibilities as resultant investment market shocks may 
impact upon economic stability. 
This study aims to fill this gap by examining whether, and how, the commercial property 
investment market and, further, investment decision-making, varies in times of uncertainty. The 
study focuses on the office, retail, industrial, leisure and hotel sectors, the largest part of the UK 
commercial property investment market, and uncertainty as measured by EPU data. Subsequently, 
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the objectives of the paper are two-fold: i) to examine the relationship between commercial 
investment property returns and EPU; and ii) to investigate the behaviour of property investors 
when making stock selection decisions under different levels of EPU. By combining these two areas 
of investigation, the study is, first, able to test for the existence of any significant relationships 
between sector level investment returns and uncertainty, important for meta-level decision-
making and policy responses. However, it is argued that a more granular investigation is also 
needed to truly explore the pricing relationships and reveal how different investment attributes are 
perceived under different levels of EPU. Thus, the second area of investigation focuses on an in-
depth exploration to further unpick the complex relationship between EPU and returns by 
examining preferences for the array of investment attributes that underlie pricing decisions. 
The work is of significance as the effects of EPU on commercial property investment activity have 
largely been ignored until now, despite the recognised potential of volatile property prices and 
returns to contribute to a destabilised economy. Hence, exploring and understanding the 
complexities of causation across and between uncertainty, behaviour and pricing is essential, to 
illuminate practices and thus enable the optimisation of market and policy responses. This paper is 
novel in that it combines macro- and micro-level approaches to investigate the investment 
decision-making process, drawing on the real estate pricing framework proposed by Crosby et al. 
(2016) which explicitly identifies these two levels of factors as important. Firstly, the paper, based 
on the aggregate level approaches in other work, tests the complexities of causation between 
changes in economic policy uncertainty and changes in asset returns. The tests are undertaken 
over time and across sectors, and reveal that two-way Granger-Causality exists between 
commercial property returns and EPU, although the relationships are complex and subject to 
differences in the occupier and investor markets across sectors. Data characteristics are also 
important.  Subsequently, the second stage, at a highly granular micro-level, uses unique primary 
behavioural data to explore individual real estate investment decisions and, specifically, whether 
investors seek the same asset characteristics in different EPU contexts. This reveals that some 
attributes remain critical to investors, regardless of uncertainty, with income security prioritised 
regardless of EPU changes. It also highlights some differences between distinct EPU regimes, 
indicating not just that investor behaviour responds to uncertainty, but the results reveal what 
those differences are. Furthermore, the findings show that behaviours vary across decision-makers 
operating within the same time period, but who have different economic outlooks.  
Through this unique combination of aggregated and granular investigations, the complexity (and 
diversity) of the relationships between policy uncertainty and investment returns is revealed and 
investor behaviour explicitly learned. 
 
2.0 The impact of uncertainty on investment markets 
In economics, uncertainty is differentiated from risk (Knight, 1921). In accordance with Knight, 
Bywater (2011) defined risk to be the probability that an expected cashflow (or required rate of 
return) will be achieved, while uncertainty arises from a lack of knowledge and information, and 
cannot be quantified. Hence, the information necessary to develop an optimal investment decision 
under complete uncertainty does not exist, as the unknown probability distribution means the 
effects cannot be modelled or subject to a rational decision-making process. Investors behaving 
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with rationality who employ a decision-making process based on past experiences and theoretical 
knowledge is a fundamental premise underpinning neoclassical economics. The counter position of 
this logic is that when the future is uncertain and there is insufficient information to guide 
investors, then investors investing under such conditions display irrational behaviour such as the 
herd-like flight to quality common after an unusual investment market event (Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2008; Baltatescu, 2015). 
However, investors must still make decisions under uncertainty and investments will always 
contain an element of uncertainty. The level of uncertainty will vary and Hargitay and Yu (1993) 
categorised this as a “spectrum of uncertainty” where the lowest level of uncertainty is absolute 
certainty and represents risk-free cashflows. The highest level of risk to cashflows is absolute 
uncertainty, which is unmeasurable and aligns with what economists call Knightian Uncertainty. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2012) differentiate between types, or causes of uncertainty, such as political 
uncertainty (whether current government policy will change) and impact uncertainty (what the 
impact of a new government policy will be). There is also general economic uncertainty, with the 
effects being defined as the political costs associated with the implementation of different policies, 
and arise as “posterior beliefs about the old policy's impact are replaced by the prior beliefs about 
the new policy's impact” (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013, p. 521). Uncertainty in general, and EPU in 
particular here, is, thus, an important consideration for investors, with Barker et al. (2016) 
discussing how it can generate share price volatility and affect levels of production investment 
activity. 
Investors and business occupiers, particularly those that are sensitive to policy shifts, become 
nervous about a changing economic outlook, especially if some of the policy changes are perceived 
as potentially reversible. This encourages behaviour, which Rodrik (1991) describes as typical 
rational behaviour, such as delaying spending, investing and expanding activities until the 
elimination of much of the residual uncertainty after the policy change. The delay in private 
investment triggered by the elevated policy uncertainty can be severe enough to dampen the 
growth of the investment market and stall economic growth. Rodrick (1991) reports that, in 
addition to individual and firm level effects, wider adverse impacts may be felt on levels of 
imports/exports, exchange rates, savings and even socio-political stability. 
The lengthier, more contentious or erratic the policy process then the greater the uncertainty and 
its effects (Friedman, 1968; Bloom, 2009). Investors and business occupiers receive continuous 
streams of news, but policy-news shocks can generate greater variation in uncertainty as these 
policy changes, motivated by a complex array of factors, are not necessarily certain to take place at 
the time of announcement. Typically, the response to government policy news is immediate and 
relatively short in duration, described by Bloom (2009) as the result of the first moment shock 
which could possibly explain the insignificant effects on business cycle fluctuations found by Born 
and Pfeifer (2014). Yet, further temporary volatility can occur in the wake of political indecision and 
the uncertainty that emerges as a result. This forces businesses and individuals to reset their 
expectations again, leading to further economic shocks (Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). These second 
moment shocks have been particularly evident in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008/09, 
as shifts in economic policy became commonplace as policy-makers responded to sequential crises 
and subsequent preventative measures. These events, and the resultant geopolitical restructuring 
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that has taken place as a consequence of the political jockeying and debates, have continued to 
drive uncertainty within the global economy.  
Brogaard and Detzel (2015) found that ambiguity around economic policy leads to economic 
effects on investment markets that increase the systematic risks faced by investors. Using an 
intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model to investigate excess returns, they found a negative 
correlation between changes in EPU and stock market returns and, further, estimated that 
economic policy indecisiveness, as measured by a one standard deviation increase in reported 
levels of EPU, was associated with a 6.12% fall in annualised returns. They also found modest 
evidence of a positive relationship between current levels of EPU and short term forecast market 
excess returns, arguing that it is possible for fund managers to structure their portfolios to hedge 
against rises in EPU. While Brogaard and Detzel find that investors are willing to accept lower 
returns on assets that protect against rising levels of EPU, Pástor and Veronesi (2013) take it a step 
further and find that this premium effect on stock market prices is dependent on wider economic 
conditions. In their model of government policy choice they estimate that change in political policy 
tends to produce a relatively higher risk premium in weaker economic conditions, concluding that 
this occurs because it is during periods of economic contraction that governments are more likely 
to make policy adjustments. 
When there is increasing EPU, private sector firms and individuals are reluctant to invest, 
contributing to delayed economic activity. Theory might suggest that increased EPU will have a 
similar effect on property investment decisions. Sum and Brown (2013) suggest that reluctance to 
expand business operations due to rising EPU will have a negative impact on occupational demand 
and rental growth. Lower rental growth expectations impact directly on investment yields, possibly 
impacting on the willingness of investors to spend on specific assets. Some threatened policy 
changes may even signal potential falls in net income cashflows, as the resultant policies would 
give rise to higher administrative and regulatory costs, or may reduce the legal protection that the 
current institutional framework provides for investors in the UK. Lieser and Groh (2014), modelling 
the transparency of the legal framework, found the political environment to be one of the key 
selection criteria used by international property investors to gauge the attractiveness of a real 
estate market. Other studies (for example, Quigley, 1999) have found that households and firms 
have adaptive expectations and, while their expectation adjustments may seemingly be in a 
rational manner, uncertainty and sudden change in government policy are known to influence their 
property investment decisions. 
Like Quigley’s (1999) study, Antonakakis et al. (2015) studied the housing sector and found links 
between EPU and the housing market. They modelled the movements in US housing returns with 
EPU, and found that high levels of EPU, particularly in the period after the recent financial crisis, 
had a negative impact on house prices, over and above the effects of changes in financial and 
economic conditions. However, they also found that this was a bi-directional process, with falls in 
house prices leading to a rise in EPU as potential government responses to a slump in the housing 
market were debated. Aye (2017) also argued there is a bi-directional relationship between EPU 
and house prices. As yet no studies have examined the linkages between policy uncertainty and 
direct commercial property returns or purchasing decisions, with the only commercial market study 
investigating property share returns. Here, Sum and Brown (2013), using US REIT and EPU monthly 
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indices spanning 1985-2011 in a series of time-varying regressions, found EPU to negatively affect 
equity and mortgage REIT returns.  
D’Arcy and Keogh (1999) argue that the performance of a national property market is defined by its 
sociocultural and political environments, and that government policy risk is a key factor in 
international investors seeking diversification. Bewley (1986) also theorised that Knightian 
Uncertainty could result in under-diversification by individual investors. Walden (2004) modelled 
venture capitalists and found that they tended to hedge against high uncertainty but, if they were 
unable to hedge, and if the potential political decisions were perceived as irreversible, investment 
would stall and, when resumed, lead to higher hurdle rates. Similarly in the real estate sector, 
evidence exists that political instability, as well as corruption and a lack of market transparency, 
deters flows of foreign capital into a country (Hine, 2001; Jones Lang LaSalle, 2008). It is also well 
established, for example using real option pricing models, that, in the development sector new 
developments and redevelopments will be postponed as uncertainty increases (be that general 
uncertainty or EPU) (Grenadier, 1996).   
Property investments lie between the two extremes on the “spectrum of uncertainty”, and pricing 
and managing the consequent risk is central to the task of the investor. Understanding where an 
individual investment lies on this spectrum underpins property investment strategies and 
decisions. The asset acquisition decision was explored by Jackson and Orr (2011), whereby primary 
data were generated from fund managers engaging in a stock selection simulation exercise, 
controlling for respondents’ stated expectations of economic and market movements. The results 
indicate that these expectations, or perceptions, do impact on micro-level investment decisions. As 
the forming of perceptions is underpinned by uncertainty, these results suggest that the level of 
EPU will impact on investment (and management) decisions. Dhar and Goetzmann (2006) conclude 
that a consequence of uncertainty in the investment decision-making process could be the 
deviation of asset prices from their market worth, and “can cause risk-taking behaviour to appear 
irrational when measured against the classical framework” (Dhar and Goetzmann, 2006, p. 109).  
This conclusion concurs with the findings of Clayton et al. (2009) and Ling et al. (2014) who find 
that investor sentiment, defined as the general prevailing attitude of investors, can cause over-
valuation and persistent mispricing in the direct real estate market. While market sentiment is the 
product of a variety of fundamental and technical factors, EPU is a component that has a direct 
impact on the confidence and psychology of the market, which in turn could constrain the ability of 
the market to arbitrage away pricing differentials and contribute to sentiment-induced mispricing 
(Ling et al., 2014). 
To provide a framework within which investment decision-making under uncertainty can be 
explored, the pricing of investments is crucial. The pricing of individual real estate assets follows 
the pricing model of Fisher (1930) and Gordon (1959) with, in some texts, an extension to include 
depreciation. More recently, some work has begun to explicitly unravel the components of the risk 
premium within the traditional model, for the real estate sector. Crosby et al. (2016) identify and 
categorise its components, proposing that, at the highest level, the model may be refined for the 
real estate asset to give: 
(1) 
k = RFR + RPREM + RPSTK 
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where k represents the expected return, RFR is the nominal risk-free rate, RPREM is the part of the 
risk premium attached to the real estate market (systematic risk) and RPSTK is the part of the risk 
premium attached to property-specific attributes (unique risk), with the pricing of those attributes 
also reflecting growth expectations and depreciation. Pricing of these two components of the risk 
premium reflects their risk and will be undertaken within the particular regime of uncertainty that 
exists, or is perceived to exist, at any given moment in time. Crosby et al. suggest that each of these 
two elements are comprised of a further series of components, such that RPREM, comprises RPmkt 
(real estate market risk), RPsct (real estate sector risk) and RPlocm (real estate market location risk); 
with RPSTK comprising RPten (tenant risk), RPlse (leasing risk factors), RPlocs (stock location risk) and 
RPbld (building risk), to give rise to a final refinement to the pricing model of: 
(2) 
k = RFR + (RPmkt + RPsct + RPlocm) + (RPten + RPlse + RPlocs + RPbld) 
Within real estate research and thus knowledge there is a considerable void regarding pricing and 
behaviour under uncertainty. Furthermore, the recognition that such pricing comprises a series of 
elements, as set out by Crosby et al., relating not just to macro-level property market factors, but 
to micro-level asset-specific factors, remains overlooked. 
This paper aims to address this gap in property investment knowledge. Corresponding to the 
study’s two research objectives, and reflective of the pricing model in Equation 1 which forms the 
overarching framework for the empirical section, a mixed methods multi-level approach is 
adopted. In the first of two stages, a macro-level examination is undertaken at the national level to 
look at the relationship between EPU and commercial property returns movements over time. This 
explores whether volatility in returns (as a function of pricing) is responsive to EPU, reflecting the 
systematic risk element of Equation 1 and underlying supposition that national level data are 
indicative of a market portfolio where stock-specific factors are diversified away.  In the second 
stage, a micro-level investigation is undertaken at the individual asset level, to examine whether 
and how investor pricing behaviour responds to EPU, with respect to stock-specific attributes, the 
unique risk component in Equation 1. This highly disaggregated stage further explores and extends 
the work of Jackson and Orr (2011) and enables investigation and enhanced understanding of 
investors’ behaviour under two contrasting EPU regimes – one period where EPU was low and 
relatively stable, and another when EPU was much higher. This helps to reveal and understand the 
factors underpinning the findings in the first stage. Thus, this paper argues that, to truly explore 
behaviour and pricing in the real estate market, there needs to be explicit recognition of these 
individual, but related, components. As set out in detail below, together these two stages explore 
relationships between uncertainty related to economic policy, returns and behaviour in a new and 
robust way. The methods and sampling are discussed over the next two sections. 
3.0 Macro-Level Stage - interaction between EPU and commercial property in the UK 
3.1 Methods and data 
In line with the first objective of this paper, to examine the relationship between commercial 
property returns and EPU, this section sets out the analytical framework and then the data used. A 
Granger Causality model is developed as an initial stage in investigating, not just whether real 
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estate market returns respond to changes in EPU, but the wider complexities of the relationship 
over time, reflecting its importance to economic stability. Granger-Causality is a form of statistical 
hypothesis test that has become an established technique in economics to probe the causal-effects 
between two variables, and is widely used to investigate the effects of EPU, although not 
previously in the commercial property sector. The specification of the linear bi-variate vector 
autoregression (VAR) model is:  
(3) 
∆𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡  
(4) 
∆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑡  
 
where ∆𝐸𝑃𝑈  refers to the differenced measure for economic policy uncertainty, ∆𝑅  is the 
differenced property returns series and 𝜇𝑡 and 𝑡 are the error terms
1. Granger-Causality does not 
necessarily measure true causality, particularly between aggregated variables, and can lead to 
misleading results if it does not capture the effects of other factors, such as economic conditions. 
Subsequently, therefore, the Granger-Causality model is extended to include an indicator variable 
(Econt):  
(5) 
∆𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜃𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
(6) 
∆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖∆
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜗𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝑡 
 
Econt, similar to the approach employed by Fuerst and Grandy (2012) whereby the effects of 
property cycle contractions were included in their development activity VAR model, is specified 
here as a dichotomous exogenous variable to identify contractions and expansions in the economy, 
and control for their potential impact on property returns and EPU2. 
The EPU data used to estimate Equations 3-6 are published on-line by Baker, Bloom and Davis as an 
index of policy uncertainty in the UK, which measures the frequency of economic policy-related 
uncertainty news items within The Times of London and Financial Times. The Baker, Bloom and 
Davis measure allows for the continuous tracking of policy uncertainty over the study period, as 
shown in Figure 1. This graph plots the monthly Economic Policy Uncertainty Index between 1997 
and 2017, and illustrates how major changes in EPU volatility in UK can be linked to key political 
                                                          
1  Johansen cointegration trace and Max-eigenvalue tests indicated no cointegration at the 0.05 level, 
implying that it was suitable to employ a VAR modelling framework for the differenced data. 
2  The dummy Econt variable enabled time points when the market was contracting to be categorised and 
avoided potential orthogonal matrix issues associated with the inclusion of EPU and a continuous variable 
measuring economic conditions. 
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events. Additionally, the time points in shade in Figure 1 represent recessionary conditions and the 
white blocks represent periods of economic expansion, as defined by the OEDC’s Turning Points 
and Component Series data series (OEDC, 2018), and used in the model as the variable Econt. 
Visually, as an overview, this indicates that variations in EPU do, at times, seem to coincide with 
economic fluctuations but, interesting, this relationship is not consistent. There are higher levels of 
EPU in the first, second, fourth and fifth periods of recession (shaded time periods), but the higher 
levels of EPU linked with the Treaty and Accession/Gulf War II and around the later Eurozone Crisis 
are clearly in times of economic expansion, as indicated in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Four types of investment return measures are modelled in Equations 3-6. The first three are the 
long-standing MSCI indices derived from valuation-based data, which seek to track transaction 
prices (MSCI, 2018): the MSCI total return index; MSCI capital growth index; and MSCI rental return 
index. The fourth is a more recently available MSCI index for the UK, which uses transaction-linked 
data. These data presently are more limited in coverage, in terms of sector, performance measure 
(being limited to capital value growth rates) and a slightly shorter time-series. They are included, 
however, to provide a useful comparison, not only to the results from the MSCI valuation-based 
indices used here and which dominate UK-based studies, but also to any future international 
studies where transaction-based data may be more widely available. All the time-series data have 
been deflated; and the valuation-based indices desmoothed, using the regime-switching 
autoregressive (TAR) method recently developed by Lizieri et al. (2012)3. This adjustment to the 
returns generating process allowed for the desmoothing parameter to vary over time as regime 
conditions change.  In this paper 3-month LIBOR rates were employed for all-property, office and 
hotel returns while FT returns, in logs, were used to determine the regime parameters for the other 
returns4. The estimates of Equations 3-6 have also been undertaken using the raw data that have 
not been desmoothed. 
 
The use of these data is based on the supposition that, predominantly, they reflect the pricing of 
real estate market factors, as set out in section 2, with the highly granular nature of stock-specific 
factors diversified away at the aggregate level. It is appropriate, however, to acknowledge that, as 
set out in Equation 2, RPREM, exposure to the real estate market is a category comprising market, 
sector and locational risks. With respect to the first one, the data do, of course, reflect 
performance and volatility of the UK’s real estate market; and with respect to the second, the 
analysis has been undertaken not just for all real estate, but by sector, to explore for any variations 
in the relationship between EPU and each commercial sector. This analysis is at the aggregated 
national level so does not explore locational variations, as to define coherent and distinct locations, 
based on underlying market fundamentals, is a study in itself and outside of the current focus. 
                                                          
3  Lizieri et al. (2012) found that their TAR-TAR model outperformed conventional AR smoothing techniques 
which underestimate the variance of the true underlying series. However, for fullness and comparison, 
the valuation-based indices have also been desmoothed using the first order autoregressive (AR(1)) 
process  proposed by Geltner (1993). For conciseness of presentation, the results using the AR 
desmoothed data are shown in the appendix. The results are highly similar, although it is interesting to 
note that, where there are differences, the results using the AR smoothing technique are consistent with 
the results obtained using the raw data. 
4  Selection of these regime determinants was based on the minimisation of the sum of errors and Aikake 
Information Criterion as advised in Lizieri et al. (2012).  
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The statistical properties of time series data are another important consideration in devising a 
suitable modelling framework. Table 1 reports the ADF statistics for EPU and for the first three 
measures of real property performance (both overall and for each sector), deflated using the TAR-
TAR method, when the lag length is selected by minimising the Schwarz Information Criterion. The 
tests reveal that the data series in levels contain unit roots but are stationary (I(0)) when 
differenced5. The ADF statistics for EPU and the transaction-linked index are shown in the 
appendix, in Table A3.a. The null hypothesis testing ∆EPU Granger-Cause ∆R (Equations 3 and 5) 
and ∆R Granger-Cause ∆EPU (Equations 4 and 6) is then undertaken using the stationary data and 
chi-square testing. The optimal lag length (underpinning the results presented in Tables 2 and A3.b, 
the latter in the appendix) selection selected for the ∆EPU and ∆R variables in the VAR model is 
determined by the Aikake Information Criterion. 
[Insert Table 1] 
3.2 Findings 
The results obtained from the estimation of Equations 5 and 6 are fully aligned with and confirm 
the results for the initial model represented by Equations 3 and 4. Therefore, the results derived 
from the VAR model specified by Equations 5 and 6, being more sophisticated, form the focus of 
the discussion here. The results derived using the valuation-based data are shown in Table 2. The 
supplementary results, firstly using the more limited coverage provided by the transaction-linked 
data and, secondly, the raw data, are shown in the appendices for conciseness of presentation. For 
the main results, as set out in Table 2, focusing initially on the aggregated all-property data, there is 
a bi-directional relationship between total returns and EPU and capital growth and EPU, but there 
appears to be no relationship between income return and EPU. Breaking down these findings to 
explore for sectoral variations, the results from Equation 5 suggest the influence of EPU on 
property total returns is sector dependent. In more detail and focusing on the three main sectors, 
there is evidence that changes in EPU Granger-Cause total returns in the office sector. The data for 
the office sector are heavily dominated by the London markets, which tend to have greater 
exposure to international investors and occupiers than other sectors (Mitchell, 2016), who may be 
highly sensitive and responsive to relative national changes in EPU.  
The results for the industrial sector are different. There are increasingly diverse occupiers in this 
sector where manufacturing output is sensitive to exchange rate movements and previous studies 
have shown that shifts in levels of EPU can drive exchange rate movements (for example, Balcilar et 
al., 2016). Manufacturing, alongside the expanding logistics sector, drives occupation demand in 
the industrial sector and, as Baker et al. (2016) identified, production is susceptible to uncertainty 
so you would expect the effects of EPU on output and distribution to impact on investors’ 
perceptions of default risk and/or reduce rental growth prospects. However, this is not the case 
where the results suggest EPU does not Granger-Cause total returns.  These results are mirrored in 
the retail sector, which is largely (although not exclusively) driven by domestic consumer spending 
and behaviour, and dominated by UK retailers. This is, perhaps, surprising in the retail sector as, 
with the economic uncertainty and lack of growth in the decade after 2007 leading to austerity 
measures and the consequent impact on consumer spending, one might have expected to detect 
                                                          
5  In the case of retail income returns, they had to be second differenced before becoming stationary. 
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clearer evidence of the responsiveness in property returns to changes in EPU. It may be that 
unsecured credit, which has typically driven consumer spending and uncontrolled surges in lending, 
both prior to 2008 and the renewed escalation in household debt since 2014, may be masking the 
effects of rising EPU (Bank of England, 2018). However, this is not revealed from the desmoothed 
data in Table 2, although it is supported by the results found using raw valuation-based data (See 
Table A2 in the Appendix). 
Exploring other measures of return, there is no evidence that changes in EPU Granger-Cause 
income return in any of the main sectors. This lack of causality is consistent with the leasing 
structure in the UK, where rents are most commonly fixed for a period of say 3-5 years. With 
respect to capital growth, as presented in Table 2, only in the office sector is there evidence that 
changes in EPU Granger-Cause changes in capital growth (and this is consistent with the results 
from both the raw and transaction-linked data sets, as shown in the appendices). Examining the 
results when the estimations are repeated using the transaction-linked data, shown in Table A3.b 
in the appendices, notably the significant unidirectional relationship between EPU and capital 
growth for all three sectors suggests that pricing in the market is more sensitive to EPU than is 
being picked up by the appraisal data. 
Examining the other sectors, the hotel and leisure sectors (when disaggregated from the “Other 
Property” category) show no interactions between EPU and any measure of returns for Equation 5. 
These are growth sectors in the UK property investment market where demand for these types of 
accommodation is driven by a multitude of factors. Many frequent users of hotels do so for 
essential business purposes and are more likely to change hotel specification rather than not travel. 
Occasional users consist of international tourists who travel to satisfy personal choice and would 
not typically be influenced by UK politics or policy, notwithstanding any shift in behaviour in the 
final 18 months of the data series, following the Brexit referendum.  
In contrast to the sector-dependency detected in the results of the estimations of Equation 5, the 
results from Equation 6 suggest that changes in total returns in all three main sectors drive EPU. 
The direction of this relationship appears to indicate that policy debates arise as a result of changes 
in the real estate sector, with those policy debates in turn having the potential to generate 
uncertainty that can cause volatility in economic and financial systems. It may be suggested that 
changes in investment performance indicators, especially those that are relatable in news coverage 
such as the affordability of rental levels and business viability, alongside shifts in consumer 
behaviour and changes in other macro-economic variables, can drive policy debates over taxation, 
wage negotiations and other fiscal changes. One example is the often high profile debates around 
changes in the retail sector, the impacts of which on the high street are highly visible to wider 
stakeholder groups. This direction of causation may be particularly notable following a financial 
crisis and, certainly, following the most recent crisis, there were widely reported debates and 
attempts to derisk and delever the property investment market through changes to banking 
regulations and other changes in Stamp Duty Land Tax and business rates. These assertions are 
further supported in the findings of Antonakakis and Floros (2016), who examined the 
interdependencies between the macro-economy and housing market, stock market and policy 
uncertainty, and found evidence of two-way effects from the asset markets to industrial production 
growth, inflation and interest rates, which in turn have corresponding spillover effects that impact 
on EPU. It may be that such contemporaneous feedback mechanisms also exist for the commercial 
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property sectors, which also impact on default rates and, therefore, investment yields, and can give 
rise to increased EPU as policy-makers debate how best to manage and support these sectors in 
the context of highly visible vacancy rates in urban areas.  
In terms of other measures of investment performance, only in the retail (and aggregate “Other 
Property”) sector do income returns appear to have significant causality driving EPU levels for the 
results. Only in the office sector, do changes in capital growth drive EPU (with no relationship 
evident from the transaction-linked data). These findings further reflect the unique (newsworthy) 
factors in the occupier market in the retail sector and investor market in the office sector, as 
explored above, and their importance to economic growth and, hence policy debate. 
This first stage of the study has provided insights into the complexities of the relationships between 
commercial investment property returns and EPU. At the highest level of aggregation, for all 
property, as set out in Table 2, total returns are seen to change in response to changing uncertainty 
and this is most strongly confirmed in the office sector. The retail and industrial sectors, however, 
perhaps surprisingly, appear different. Over the longer term, consumer spending, the holy grail in 
the investor market of the retail sector (and the expanding logistics sector of the industrial market), 
has been comparatively resilient. Rising vacancy rates in the retail sector in more recent years are 
linked to business factors and consumer behaviour, rather than economic policy uncertainty; yet 
those vacancies themselves are highly visible in the news and shown to trigger policy debates and 
uncertainty. Finally, and interestingly, the results shown for comparison in the appendices suggest 
that transaction-linked capital returns are more sensitive to EPU than the appraisal data in Table 2 
suggest. These results add valuable knowledge to this area, which has largely been overlooked in 
previous studies. However, a disaggregated approach is needed to truly explore the drivers 
underlying the results and, thus, provide new insights into the effects of uncertainty on the actual 
decision-making of investors. Therefore, to do this, the second stage of the study focuses on 
investigating investment decision-making at the micro-level to see if, and how, behaviour and, 
specifically, the purchase preferences underlying pricing decisions differ across contrasting period 
of EPU.  
[Insert Table 2] 
[Insert Table 3] 
4.0 Micro-Level Stage - stock acquisition under different EPU regimes  
4.1 Methods and data 
This second stage of the study seeks to gain insights into the second component of the real estate 
risk premium framework (Equation 1), the pricing of unique risk at the asset level and how it 
changes under different EPU regimes. This requires the collection and analysis of primary data from 
individual active investment agents, to assess behaviour and investment preferences. This was 
undertaken at two contrasting points in time, as shown in Figure 2. The first was in Q2 2007, a 
period of low and fairly stable EPU, before the collapse of the Northern Rock bank in the UK which 
was the first major signal of the subsequent credit restrictions and the consequent liquidity crisis.6 
                                                          
6  However, a shift in credit risk perceptions in the general economy was evident during this study period as 
the TED spread had started to rise in April/May. 
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The survey was repeated almost a decade later in Q2 2016 under different EPU conditions. The 
survey was completed just before the vote in the UK Brexit Referendum and, as seen in Figure 2, 
EPU was much higher and less stable.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
The survey collected data on investors’ purchasing decision-making at the stock selection stage, 
within the explicit context of their expectations of market movements. Expectations of market 
movements were captured through their stated views of both rental movements (to reflect income 
return potential and risk) and yield movements (to reflect capital and total return risk). The data 
were captured through a conjoint survey that required investors to make a series of investment 
acquisition decisions, the choices presented being designed to simulate the complexities of a real 
world investment situation. This is important because it allows us to see whether, and how, 
investor behaviour and preferences for real estate asset attributes differ under contrasting EPU 
regimes, while controlling for different economic outlooks. The surveys focused on replicating the 
forward-looking nature of the decision-making process, through simulating the complex 
investment characteristics of real estate stock, and this is novel and also important in a study of 
uncertainty. Situating this within the actual market and economic contexts that respondents were 
working under provides compelling and grounded evidence of their perceptions and behaviour 
under different EPU regimes. 
4.1.1 CBC survey design  
Choice Based Conjoint (CBC) surveys were undertaken in 2007 and 2016. The two surveys used 
almost identical ways of presenting and completing the CBC survey, the first survey period involved 
the researchers visiting the respondents in person with the survey on a laptop (with additional 
contextual data collected through a short interview); whereas the second survey was administered 
on-line, including both the CBC survey and collection of contextual data.7 The CBC survey method 
can help examine the process by which a purchasing decision is made when an investor is faced 
with making a choice between alternative investment opportunities, each comprising a 
combination of different attributes. These attributes align with the pricing model presented in 
Equation 2.  
Eight attributes were employed in the surveys (drawing from the conceptual framework and 
attribute definitions established by Jackson and Orr, 2008; 2011), with refinement made to the 
attribute levels in the second period to reflect updates over the decade. These are summarised in 
Table 3, with adjustments highlighted in italics. 
[Insert Table 3] 
                                                          
7  Software developments allowed the CBC questionnaire to be delivered online and this gave rise to some 
possible differences in completions. By using an online tool, it was possible for the respondents to start 
but not complete the survey, whereas this was encountered only once in the first period. In both survey 
periods, respondents worked through the tasks alone, although in 2006 the researcher was in the room. 
By contrast, in 2016, the respondents may have rushed or, indeed, have taken greater care when 
completing the survey. No obvious patterns were found when interview and question completion times 
were reviewed across the respondents of both surveys.  
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The CBC survey involved presenting each respondent with twenty randomised choice-based 
investment acquisition tasks consisting of different assets characterised by different combinations 
of attribute levels. Each task contained three investment options, with clear instructions to select 
one of two assets for purchase or, a third choice, of selecting neither. The choice was based on the 
assumption that the assets and their attributes were correctly priced. The randomised design of 
the survey, with balanced overlap, while widely regarded as slightly less efficient than a fixed 
orthogonal design plan, is preferred as it has the offsetting advantage of being easy to implement 
and is robust in character (Mulhern, 1999; Chrzan and Orme, 2000). Although prohibitions reduce 
the efficiency of a CBC design, six two-way prohibitions were included in the 2016 survey between 
some of the location, BREEAM and economic and functional obsolescence levels to avoid illogical 
combinations in the light of the revised BREEAM levels. 
4.1.2 Survey sample 
A purposive sampling approach was adopted, with survey participants selected for their 
involvement in property fund management. The selection criteria also required their fund to be UK-
based to ensure the relevance of the specified property attributes, and their exposure to UK 
specific economic and EPU conditions. In both cases the sample was constructed from online 
sources such as the UK Property Investors Directory (Data, 2004), EGi Who’s Who listing service, 
LinkedIn, the Investment Property Forum membership database (the authors are members), 
company websites, Trustnet, and AREF. The starting point for the development of the 2016 
database was the sample of respondents in the previous survey although 30% of those 
respondents could not be included, variously due to leaving the industry or the UK, moving out of 
fund management, or because they simply could not be traced. While it is not assumed that the 
sample comprises the entire population of property fund managers, towards the end of the process 
of developing the sample, each new data source yielded fewer and fewer new additions8. 
Table 4 provides a comparison of the respondents at the two survey points. This shows that the 
gender and skills breakdown of the samples are broadly similar. One noticeable difference is that 
there are not as many 2016 respondents with over ten years of experience in their current role. 
This implies that the 2016 sample may be younger and less experienced but 88% of the sample has 
over ten years of experience in the property industry overall. 
Table 4 also shows the breakdown of the 336 industry participants targeted in the 2016 sample, 
where data are available. The data reveal that the characteristics of the respondents align with the 
overall sample, really quite closely. The gender breakdown of respondents is very closely aligned 
and, for the current position, there are slightly fewer respondents at Director level, balanced 
against marginally higher proportions in all other categories. This implies that the profile of 
respondents is closely matched to the wider population of fund managers, with no obvious reason 
to suspect response rate bias. 
                                                          
8  In 2007 the sample was developed and contacted in two stages, increasing the number of respondents 
iteratively, until resources were exhausted and sufficient responses achieved. In 2016, due to the use of 
the online survey method of data collection, a larger sample was needed and thus in total a sample of 377 
was drawn, giving an achieved sample of 336 after allowing for fund managers moving company, funds or 
position, on maternity/paternity leave and erroneous contact details.  From this, a response rate of 15.5% 
was achieved. 
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[Insert Table 4] 
The respondents’ expectations for the property market and the economy are categorised in Table 5 
and reveal mixed expectations at both survey points, although there is more positivity in the earlier 
period and more negativity and uncertainty in the second period. In the second period, six 
respondents placed a caveat on their responses with respect to the forthcoming UK Brexit 
referendum vote, evidencing the level of uncertainty in the market. 
[Insert Table 5] 
4.1.3 CBC estimation methods 
The CBC conjoint survey enables the collection of discrete choice data and estimation of the 
relative importance respondents place on each attribute and attribute levels as measures of utility 
(part-worths) (Sawtooth Software, 2013). The relative size of these utility measures provides a 
gauge of the relative importance placed on an attribute and level. The higher the part-worth utility 
then the more desirable that attribute is perceived.  
The utilities can be estimated in a number of ways but the most sophisticated method is the 
Hierarchical Bayes (HB) estimation method (Sawtooth Software, 2009a). The results reported in 
this paper9 are based on the HB estimation approach because it enables the robust analysis of 
individual respondents, and can be used to aggregate individual respondents into homogenous a 
priori groupings, here the groupings being expectations with respect to market movement.  
The HB estimation procedure is based on Bayesian methods that are used to estimate the 
parameters of a randomized coefficients regression model. It is called hierarchical because it 
consists of two levels. At the top level, all the respondents are considered to be members of a 
population of similar individuals, and averaged part-worth utilities, means and variances are 
calculated as a multivariate normal distribution10 across the entire sample (Sawtooth Software, 
2009a). The bottom level calculates the part-worth utilities for each individual (ith) with the 
probabilities of an individual investor choosing an alternative investment estimated as a standard 
multinominal logit specification.11 At the individual level, the probability (pik) of an individual investor 
(ith) choosing the kth investment option in a particular choice task is estimated using the following 
real estate investment choice model: 
                                                          
9 Multinomial Logit (MNL) analysis, which examines the relative importance of attributes by considering 
the difference each attribute could make to the total utility of a real estate asset, is used in a preliminary 
analysis to check the robustness of the results and thus the appropriateness of proceeding with the HB 
analysis. 
10  The top level model, a multivariate logit model with random effects to allow parameters to vary across 
individuals, derives sample averages from 51 respondents, each performing 20 tasks. This prior and 
posterior information from the between and within group estimations informs the likelihood provided by 
the lower level model as specified in Equation 7. A total of 1020 observations were collected at each 
survey point enabling segmentation and analysis and, as recommended with relatively small samples 
design, efficiency tests were undertaken before and after the fieldwork to ensure the survey design was 
efficient.   
11  The standard MNL model is specified as 𝑝𝑘 =  
𝑒(𝑈𝑘)
𝑒𝑈1+𝑒𝑈2+𝑒𝑈3
 where the probability of selecting a specific 
investment is proportional to the total utility for that concept (𝑈𝑘), estimated by adding the utility associated 
with each attribute level, relative to the total utility for the three options available (Sawtooth Software, 
2009b). 
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(7) 
𝑝𝑖𝑘 =
𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
′ 𝛽𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝑖𝐽
𝑗=1
 
Here, i represents individual ith’s part-worth utility for the attribute levels of the kth alternative 
and 𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ is a vector of estimated values describing the jth alternative in that choice task, 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑘
′ 𝛽𝑖is the 
exponential of the alternative investment utility and  ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽𝑖𝐽
𝑗=1  represents the sum of the 
exponential part-worth utilities for all the investment options. The part-worth utility parameters 
for each individual, along with the model’s mean of the distributions of worths and the matrix of 
the variances and covariances associated with that distribution, are estimated by a Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain procedure. This is a statistically robust iterative procedure that determines the 
parameters employed in each iteration from the previous iteration using a constant set of 
probabilistic transition rules and continues for a large number of iterations until convergence is 
achieved. The final individual partworth estimates are derived by averaging the several thousand 
iterations saved (Sawtooth Software, 2009a). 
4.2 Findings  
Tables 6 and 7 show the results of the CBC analysis, with investor preferences towards attributes 
(Table 6) and attribute levels (Table 7) segmented by property market outlook, in each of the two 
EPU contexts. The tables show the segmented average importance of attributes and average 
utilities for attribute levels to reveal any differences in investment behaviour in each period and, 
furthermore, for investors with contrasting expectations. 
[Insert Table 6] 
4.2.1 Tenant creditworthiness 
The creditworthiness of the tenant is, as expected above, consistently seen as very important in the 
decision to invest, ranked at third and second place in the early low and later high periods of EPU, 
respectively (as seen in Table 6). At an aggregate level, this desire for income security, consistent 
regardless of fluctuating EPU, might begin to explain the lack of relationship between EPU and 
income return at the aggregate level. Segmenting the results, again there is a high ranking when 
EPU is high, regardless of market expectations; and also when EPU is low, although only when 
expectations are for a rising or stable market. Creditworthiness is seen as less important to those 
with expectations of a falling market (or those with uncertain expectations), with the rent review 
clause taking its place in the ranking. Here, protecting the income stream through 
frequent/upwards-only reviews is seen to become a priority, with tenant default less of a concern 
under low EPU. 
The most preferred level of creditworthiness in 2016, as seen in Table 7, is most often minimum 
risk of tenant default; only when the expectation is of market stability are investors willing to take 
on slightly greater risk. In the earlier period there was more variation, with some investors 
selecting tenants with lower covenant strengths, either indicating low expectations of tenant 
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default when uncertainty is low, or perhaps the greater acceptance of an opportunistic investment 
style prior to the financial crisis. 
[Insert Table 7] 
4.2.2 Leasing factors 
At an aggregate level, all four attributes relating to leasing characteristics are in the bottom half of 
investor preferences, with the one exception where BREEAM is ranked as seventh most important 
attribute, in the first period. The consistently low level of importance awarded to the finer leasing 
details of an asset perhaps, in part, further explains the insignificant relationship between income 
return and EPU at the all property level. Despite the low level of importance overall, the finer 
details do reveal that risk mitigation is a core concern generally, and more so in response to greater 
uncertainty. 
Regarding diversity within the income stream generated by a property (single or multi-let), the 
highest level of multi-tenancy available to respondents (more than 5 tenants) is preferred when 
EPU is low, regardless of expectations of market movements, and this holds when EPU is higher, for 
those with expectations of a rising or a stable market. The least preferred is 2-5 tenants for these 
investors, although these preferences swap place where expectations are for a falling market. 
Those with an uncertain outlook prefer a single-let property, presumably where the tenant is 
carefully selected with a high quality covenant as identified above. Similarly, the preferences for 
the rent review clause and period to expiry/break indicate the controlling, or mitigation of risk. Over 
the last few decades there have been shifts in the characteristics of the typical UK lease, with both 
review periods and lease length falling, with break clauses more common. These changes represent 
increased risk to the stability of the investment income stream, with the UK lease structure 
historically providing high levels of certainty (and protection) to the investor. The desire to mitigate 
these risks becomes increasingly evident as EPU rises, with a slight shift in preference away from a 
2-3 yearly review pattern, towards a review clause where the rent is set annually, linked to an index 
or turnover. This will enable investors to capture, more quickly, any market rises in rents received, 
important in periods of uncertainty. The result is, however, with the exception of those with mixed 
expectations who, perhaps surprisingly, prefer traditional rent reviews that take place every 4 or 
more years with no upwards only clause. Concern over risk to the income stream through 
expiry/break appears consistent regardless of EPU, with the almost 100% unanimous preference, 
regardless of expectations of performance, for the longest period to expiry/break (over 10 years) 
and, similarly, almost all least prefer the shortest period to expiry/break (less than 5 years). 
There are some exceptions, however, where some of the finer details are less clear. For example, 
whether the property is single or multi-let is less important to investors under higher EPU (ranked 
fifth most important attribute in 2007, but 8th in 2016). The only lack of consistency to this is that it 
is more important when EPU is higher for investors who are uncertain about market movements 
(where it is ranked 5th), which would be expected. The general fall in importance, however, is 
perhaps unexpected. Along with creditworthiness, the number of tenants and, therefore, 
diversification in cashflows comprising overall income, might be expected to be more important in 
times of uncertainty (notwithstanding management obligations).  
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The user/assignment clause is considered to be one of the least important factors in the decision to 
invest. In the earlier period of low EPU, there was unanimity that a standard clause is preferred, 
with a restrictive clause, which would restrict prospective tenant demand, least preferred. In the 
second period, of higher EPU, while those with expectations for a rising or falling market still prefer 
a standard user/assignment clause, those in a stable market prefer a relaxed or no user/assignment 
clause. The preference for a relaxed clause in a stable market might be an attempt, by some, to 
minimise any further restrictions on tenant base in a market where the future tenant demand is 
uncertain due to rising EPU. That said, the preference for a restrictive user clause by those with a 
mixed outlook suggests that some investors might prefer to keep tighter controls on the tenant 
mix, perhaps as a way to manage the uncertainty. It is clear that investor behaviour is complex and 
nuanced.12 
4.2.3 Location 
There was a 100% unanimous preference for the location attribute in 2007, both in terms of 
location being the most important factor to investors regardless of expectations of performance 
(Table 6), and also for that location to be a town or city centre prime pitch (Table 7). Although this 
holds for the aggregated sample in 2016, it does vary when the sample is segmented, with only 
those who expect the market to be stable or fall favouring it as the most important attribute; while 
it is seen as the second most important attribute for those who see the market rising and also 
those with mixed views about future market conditions. Despite this ranking in second place, the 
utility levels for location are greater than for any other attribute for those that ranked location as 
most preferred. Across all groups there is consistency in that in-town or city centre is the most 
preferred location and that the least preferred location at both survey points is one with no 
existing public transport, either in a suburban location if expectations are for a rising market, or in 
an out-of-town location where expectations are for a stable or falling market.  
These consistent preferences for (a prime and central) location when selecting stock, arguably 
indicate a concern for minimising both risk and uncertainty in long-term investment returns, across 
all measures of return. Rising EPU only seems to strengthen this behaviour (evidenced by the 
higher average utility given to location for the sample as a whole), often termed a flight to safety or 
“institutional conservatism” by Keogh (1994; p. 67) in the real estate market, and found in the 
equities market by Ulrich (2012).  
4.2.4 Building risk  
One finding that stands out above all others is the preferences of investors towards properties with 
sustainability ratings, specifically the BREEAM rating. However, this is the one attribute where the 
context for the investment decision has changed fundamentally during the time between the two 
surveys. Sustainability has risen markedly in priority for all investors between the two survey 
periods; in the first survey it was in the bottom half of the preference rankings (7th out of the eight 
attributes) but is up to 3rd most preferred attribute in the later survey, overall. During this decade 
sustainability awareness and actions increased generally, with perhaps a shifting of investors’ 
strategic objectives encouraged by the Energy Act 2011 and possibly even pre-emptive action 
                                                          
12  The fund strategy was collected from respondents, but the results cannot be disaggregated further by 
this additional variable due to the resulting small sample sizes. 
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arising from cautiousness stemming from the uncertainty surrounding future environmental policy 
and debates around tightening the EPC requirements.  
The rising importance of the sustainability rating in the acquisition decision indicates, it may be 
argued, a concern towards the “future-proofing” of investment performance. Control, or mitigation 
of future risk, is a key component of total returns and is especially important in times of 
uncertainty. Investment behaviour, such as seen here, will be one of the factors underpinning the 
significant relationship where changes in EPU are seen to Granger-Cause changes in transaction-
transaction-linked capital change, not just in the all property aggregated analysis above, but also in 
office, industrial and retail sectors. Indeed, in both survey periods the results indicate that the 
BREEAM rating of a property becomes increasingly important as expectations of market 
performance move to that of a falling market. Furthermore, in the latter period, of higher EPU, the 
BREEAM rating is the most sought after attribute for investors with mixed, or unclear, expectations 
of market movement. This may be further explained through one possible consequence of rising 
EPU being indecisiveness, with Knightian Decision Theory implying that ambiguity might result in 
incomplete preferences, with indecisive individuals choosing the status quo (or future-proofing) 
option when there is no clear alternative option to this (Sautua, 2017). 
In contrast to the marked rising importance placed on the BREEAM rating, the ranking for economic 
and functional obsolescence is generally high and consistent. It was consistently identified as the 
second most important attribute in the first survey period, across all groups of respondents 
regardless of market expectation, but preference given to this attribute varied when EPU was 
higher. Then, it was rated the most important variable in a rising, and second place in a stable, 
market. However, it falls to 4th most important attribute in a falling market (behind location, 
BREEAM rating and creditworthiness of the tenant) and even further in the priorities given by the 
investors who had mixed views of how the market would perform in the short run (behind 
additional attributes reflecting leasing factors). The fall in importance of economic and functional 
obsolescence as both EPU rises and market expectations worsen, may reflect an immediate short-
term priority of seeking a secure income stream, with tenant and leasing attributes being 
increasingly important. It may also reflect, however, a rise in (some) investors moving towards 
investment strategies (such as core+ or value-added) that grant opportunities for higher returns by 
working assets more, particularly during falling markets.  A consequence of this is that they place 
less importance on obsolescence at acquisition (INREV, 2016; 2017).  
Notwithstanding this, the preferred level of specification and internal configuration is most often 
high specification and flexible internal configuration, with low spec/flexibility least preferred. 
Properties with the greatest flexibility should, ceteris paribus, attract the highest level of user 
demand over the longer term and, thus, provide attractive investment performance. Further, high 
spec premises should, it can be argued, be attractive to tenants with good covenant strength who 
are seeking long-term occupation, the holy grail of many (core) investment strategies. This further 
indicates ex-ante risk management strategies are a consideration in the decision-making process, 
with a degree of risk-taking an inherent element of non-core funds.  
5.0 Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has sought to extend our knowledge and appreciation of the factors that underpin the 
performance of real estate, by examining whether, and how, the investment market and, further, 
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investment decision-making, varies in times of different economic policy uncertainty. It is 
pioneering in that it is the first published study to explore the complex relationships between 
uncertainty, behaviour and pricing in the commercial property market. It does this using Crosby et 
al.’s (2016) pricing framework, specifically recognising the complexities of the real estate market, 
to guide the overall design and analytical approach. The paper is able to offer a new richness of 
analysis through its multi-stage and multi-level approach, reflecting both the macro and micro 
elements of the real estate risk premium.  
Thus, exploring the macro element of the risk premium, like earlier studies into the effects of EPU 
in the stock and housing markets, this study finds evidence that inter-connections exist between 
policy uncertainty and performance of the real estate sector overall, before moving on to reveal 
more nuanced results for the individual office, industrial and retail sectors. This stage is, however, 
only half of the story regarding pricing and, thus, performance as, using the Crosby et al. model, 
this provides insights only into links between uncertainty and real estate at the level of the real 
estate market. It is argued that, to truly explore whether and how behaviour and pricing in the real 
estate market respond to changing EPU, there also needs to be recognition of the pricing of 
property-specific attributes, which form the second part of the model, and which, additionally, 
begin to explain the aggregated results. 
In more detail, in the first stage, Granger-Causality tests were used to determine whether 
movement in investment returns is responsive to fluctuations in uncertainty, as measured by 
economic policy news, or if returns drive policy uncertainty. The results reveal that two-way 
Granger-Causality exists between aggregated all-property total returns and EPU; with mixed results 
for capital growth and income return performance measures. At the sectoral level, these results 
hold for the relationship between total returns and EPU in the office sector but variations in the 
results reflect the specifics of the investment and occupier markets across the main sectors. A 
result of note is that, for all three sectors, the results suggest that there is evidence that the market 
can affect government policy choices. In the retail and industrial markets this appears to come 
from the occupier sector, perhaps reflecting the greater visibility and, thus, possibly more 
newsworthy nature of these sub-markets, especially given the expansion of logistics within the 
industrial sector, linked to the retail sector. The direction of this relationship may be the subject of 
debate, however, and could usefully form the focus for further research. The links between EPU 
and capital returns are much stronger and bi-directional in the office sector, suggesting political 
uncertainty has a greater effect on property yields and that there is a risk premium associated with 
an uncertain political environment, supporting Brogaard and Detzel’s (2015) finding that EPU levels 
have a greater effect on stock discount rates than net cash flows. 
Following these first insights, a highly granular approach was used in the micro-level second stage 
of investigation. Here, exploring the pricing of stock-specific attributes within the study framework, 
individual purchase investment decisions were examined and the results explored not just with 
regard to uncertainty, but to see whether individual behaviours might begin to explain the findings 
of the first stage. This stage of the study unpicked and revealed investors’ preferences under 
different EPU conditions, something that has never been done before. This was possible through a 
novel method of data collection and the development of an analytical approach to examine how 
shifting levels of EPU impact on investment purchase preferences and pricing behaviour.  
21 
A number of results seem to provide clear findings. At both the all-property level and the sectoral 
level, the results in the first stage revealed that movements in income return do not respond to 
changes in EPU, with the second stage revealing that the behaviour of investors shows concern for 
income security (through tenant creditworthiness) that is consistent regardless of levels of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, although concern for finer leasing details are comparatively low in 
investor preferences, again regardless of uncertainty, there is a high degree of consistency in risk 
mitigation in choices made. There are, as would be expected, some variations in preferences in 
different EPU regimes, such as when a more relaxed concern over tenant default in times of low 
EPU allows a switch in preference towards more frequent reviews if the market is expected to fall.   
In contrast to income returns, the results showed a stronger relationship between EPU and total 
returns, especially in the all-property and office sector, and capital returns, again for the all-
property and office sectors but also additionally revealed through the transaction-linked data, 
suggesting yields respond more to uncertainty. This is evident when investors are selecting stock 
for acquisition, with those variables that, arguably, indicate a concern for future-proofing. For 
example, the utility levels for location across the sample as a whole are higher when there is 
greater uncertainty and this is even more marked for the prime central location preferred. 
Enhanced concern for future-proofing is also seen in the far higher importance placed on the 
BREEAM rating of the asset in the second period, although it is not possible to distinguish whether 
raised uncertainty, or increased awareness generally, is the cause for this. While this increased 
awareness could have been driven by the increased importance given by many occupiers and 
investors to sustainability in their business operations, such significant structural changes are not 
replicated in the other risk components, between the two periods. 
Under certainty, Jansen van Vuuren (2017) deduced that market agents would display “hyper-
rationality”, resulting in homogenous investors with the same preferences that would not adapt 
their future behaviour in response to exogenous changes. However, if normal uncertainty exists 
then the imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality would give rise to heterogeneous investors 
with varying preferences.  Yet, under abnormal uncertainty, irrationality kicks in and behavioural 
patterns become unclear. We see, perhaps, evidence of bounded rationality in some of our 
findings, where preferences vary across heterogeneous investors, as evidenced by different 
expectations of market direction and, underpinning this, the adoption of different investment 
strategies as would be expected with uncertainty. In addition, we see, perhaps, evidence of unclear 
behavioural patterns, associated with irrationality, through those fund managers that are least 
clear about the future and have purchasing preferences that stand out as being very different to 
other fund managers. 
These findings have significant implications. From a policy perspective, the results indicate that 
high economic policy uncertainty can have significant, even destabilising, effects on the property 
market, as pricing responds. While much is still to be learnt about the role of government in 
property investment pricing, policy makers need to be aware that untimely policy changes or lack 
of clarity around future economic policy decisions can increase risk to investors, and that they need 
to consciously seek out remedies to reduce uncertainty on business and investment confidence and 
in the economy. Turning away from the measure of EPU used here, issues around confidence and 
uncertainty have increased significantly in recent years with the now immediate and rapid debate 
and challenges to accountability that take place within social media.  
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Finally, the study has confirmed that EPU is an investment risk factor and, furthermore, that it is 
reflected in (some) pricing behaviour. Rational investors, wanting to reduce the vulnerability of 
their holdings to EPU, will want to weight portfolios in favour of less EPU-sensitive assets when 
uncertainty is expected to rise. The findings in this study indicate that the leisure and hotel sectors 
offer such opportunities, with returns not linked to EPU. These are growth sectors and long-term 
consistency in this finding is not certain. Future research into property pricing, such as an extension 
to the Crosby et al pricing framework, should explicitly allow for EPU. Conversely, and importantly, 
there are findings that reveal that EPU responds to the property market, confirming the 
importance of the sector to economic stability. Linked to this, and not just regarding domestic 
investment, policy-makers should note the evidence of the complex bi-directional relationship 
between uncertainty and market performance. This provides evidence supporting Brogaard and 
Detzel’s (2015) discussion on how heightened uncertainty around a country’s future institutional 
framework can impact on investment decisions, which may, as noted by Lieser and Groh (2014) 
deter inward foreign investment flows. 
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Figure 1: EPU Index in the United Kingdom 
 
Source: adapted from Baker et al (2016); Baker, Bloom and Davis at www.PolicyUncertainty.com; and OEDC 
(2018). 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics, January 1997 to December 2017 Data 
 
TAR-TAR Desmoothed Real Data 
 
ADF Test  
 
Lag 
Length 
ADF Test  
 
Lag 
Length Levels Differenced 
Real Total Return 
All Property (RPREM) 0.994 
 
2 -14.109 * 1 
Sector (RPsct):  Office 0.960 
 
1 -18.314 * 0 
Industrial -0.775 
 
3 -6.537 * 2 
Retail -1.204 
 
0 -15.524 * 0 
Other 0.635 
 
2 -6.584 * 1 
Hotel# 1.678 
 
1 -12.429 * 0 
Leisure## -0.684 
 
3 -6.911 * 2 
Real Capital Growth  
All Property (RPREM) -1.331 
 
2 -14.476 * 1 
Sector (RPsct):  Office -0.876 
 
0 -17.934 * 0 
Industrial -1.534 
 
3 -6.790 * 2 
Retail -1.819 
 
0 -16.315 * 0 
Other -1.336 
 
0 -10.044 * 0 
Hotel# -1.120 
 
0 -14.058 * 0 
Leisure## -1.098 
 
4 -6.341 * 3 
Real Income Return 
All Property (RPREM) -0.166 
 
3 -5.689 * 2 
Sector (RPsct):  Office -0.857 
 
0 -7.088 * 2 
Industrial -0.374 
 
0 -16.002 * 0 
Retail -1.054 
 
0 -2.197 
 
11 
Other -0.377 
 
0 -17.728 * 0 
Hotel# -1.026 
 
12 -1.779 
 
11 
Leisure## -4.256 * 14 -8.499 * 10 
# August 2000 to December 2017; ## November 1998 to December 2017. 
* rejects null hypothesis that the time series contains unit root at 1% significance level; ** rejects the null 
hypothesis at 5% significance level; *** rejects the null hypothesis at 10% significance level. 
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Table 2: Unrestricted Bi-variate VAR Granger Causality Tests, January 1997 to December 2017 TAR-TAR Data13 
Sector Chi-sq df   Chi-sq df  
All Property    Other Property    
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 37.878 11 * EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 3.093 5  
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 38.447 11 * Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 16.249 5 * 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 19.668 10 ** EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 1.458 5  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 24.085 10 * Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 5.394 5  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 3.663 4 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 11.380 12  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 2.487 4 
 
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 26.184 12 ** 
Office Property 
   
Hotel Property#    
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 49.917 12 * EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 0.997 5  
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 52.335 12 * Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 11.124 5 ** 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 31.610 11 * EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 0.206 3  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 30.219 11 * Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 0.757 3  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 1.530 3 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 6.018 12  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 5.116 3 
 
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 19.022 12 *** 
Industrial Property 
   
Leisure##    
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 6.528 5 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 3.387 4  
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 16.021 5 * Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 9.421 4 ** 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 3.177 4 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 0.735 4  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 4.080 4 
 
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 0.703 4  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 10.702 12 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 1.231 3  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 12.072 12 
 
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 2.412 3  
Retail Property        
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 8.785 9  # - August 2000 to December 2017; ## - November 1998 to December 2017. 
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 16.018 9 *** *     rejects null hypothesis that the time series contains unit root at 1% 
significance level. 
**   rejects the null hypothesis at 5% significance level. 
*** rejects the null hypothesis at 10% significance level. 
+     retail income returns data second differenced. 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 3.924 6  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 5.085 6  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return+ 8.799 12  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU+ 24.794 12 ** 
                                                          
13  The results in the table were generated using Equations 5 and 6 and fully align with those generated by testing the initial version of the model represented by Equations 3 and 4. The 
market rental growth index was also tested but found to generate no significant Granger Causality results. 
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Figure 2: Survey points 
 
Source: adapted from Baker et al (2016); Baker, Bloom and Davis at www.PolicyUncertainty.com; and OEDC (2018).  
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Table 3: Attributes and levels specified in the two surveys  
RPSTK 
component 
(Equation 2) 
Attributes Levels specified in 2007 study Levels specified in 2016 study 
RPten 
(tenant risk) 
Creditworthiness 
1) D&B 5AA rating 
2) D&B 3AA or 4AA rating 
3) D&B 1AA or 2AA rating 
4) D&B AA or BB or CC rating 
5) D&B DD or lower rating 
1) Minimum risk of tenant default 
2) Lower than average risk of tenant default 
3) Higher than average risk of tenant default 
4) High risk of tenant default 
RPlse 
(leasing risk 
factors) 
Single or multi-let 
1) Single let property 
2) 2-5 tenants 
3) More than 5 tenants 
1) Single let property 
2) 2-5 tenants 
3) More than 5 tenants 
Rent review clause 
1) Rent set annually, linked to index or turnover 
2) Rent review every 2 to 3 years, upwards only clause 
3) Rent review every 4 or more years, upwards only clause 
4) Rent review every 2 to 3 years, no upwards only clause 
5) Rent review every 4 or more years, no upwards only clause 
1) Rent set annually, linked to index or turnover 
2) Rent review every 2 to 3 years, upwards only clause 
3) Rent review every 4 or more years, upwards only clause 
4) Rent review every 2 to 3 years, no upwards only clause 
5) Rent review every 4 or more years, no upwards only clause 
Period to expiry/ break 
1) Less than 5 years 
2) 5-10 years 
3) Over 10 years 
1) Less than 5 years 
2) 5-10 years 
3) Over 10 years 
User/ Assignment clause 
1) Restrictive user/assignment clause 
2) Standard user/assignment clause 
3) Relaxed or no user/assignment clause 
1) Restrictive user/assignment clause 
2) Standard user/assignment clause 
3) Relaxed or no user/assignment clause 
RPlocs 
(stock location 
risk) 
Location 
1) In town or city centre 
2) Suburban, close to existing public transportation 
3) Suburban, no existing public transportation 
4) Out of the town/city, close to existing public transportation 
5) Out of the town/city, no existing public transportation 
1) Town or city centre, prime pitch 
2) Town or city centre, secondary pitch 
3) Suburban location, close to existing public transportation 
4) Suburban location, no existing public transportation 
5) Out of the town/city, close to existing public transportation 
6) Out of the town/city, no existing public transportation 
RPbld 
(building risk) 
BREEAM rating 
1) Pass 
2) Good 
3) Very good 
4) Excellent 
5) Not known 
1) Pass 
2) Good 
3) Very good 
4) Excellent 
5) Outstanding 
6) Not known 
Economic and functional 
obsolescence 
1) High spec and flexible internal configuration 
2) Average spec and internal configuration 
3) Low spec and inflexible internal configuration 
1) High spec and flexible internal configuration 
2) Average spec and internal configuration 
3) Low spec and inflexible internal configuration 
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Table 4 Characteristics of respondents and comparison with composition of total sample  
 
2007 Respondents 2016 Respondents 
No. % No. % (Total Sample %) 
Gender 
    
 
Male 46 90.2 45 88.2  (87.5) 
Female 5 9.8 6 11.8  (12.5) 
Current position      
Acquisition analyst/surveyor 5 9.8 1 2.0  (1.2) 
Asset manager 1 2.0 1 2.0  (1.8) 
Fund/portfolio manager 15 29.4 31 60.8  (57.1) 
Director/head of property/investment 26 51.0 15 29.4  (37.2) 
Chief executive 2 3.9 1 2.0  (1.8) 
Other 2 3.9 2 3.9  (0.9) 
Experience in current role      
0 to 5 years 11 21.6 19 37.3 N/A 
6 to 10 years 9 17.6 19 37.3 N/A 
> 10 years 31 60.8 13 25.5 N/A 
Total 51 100.0 51 100.0  
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Table 5: Categorisation of respondents’ expectation about property market conditions 
 
Survey respondents’ stated 
expectations over the coming 
year 
 
 
Respondent numbers 
in each category 
Property rents Property yields Interpretation Categorisation 2007 2016 
rising falling Yields indicating positive 
investor expectations, 
accompanied with stable 
or rising rental growth 
Rising market 25 8 
stable falling 
stable stable Yields indicating 
expectations of 
stabilisation 
Stable market 
18 24 
slowing/falling stable 
rising stable 
slowing/falling rising Yields indicating negative 
investor expectations, 
accompanied with stable 
or falling rental growth 
Falling market 
5 10 
stable rising 
falling falling 
Yields and rental growth 
moving in contrary to 
market norms 
Uncertain 
market 
3 9 
 Total 51 51 
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Table 6: Attribute Importance, Segmented by Property Market Outlook, HB Estimation 
 2007 2016 
 
Aggregate 
Total Rising Stable Falling Uncertain 
Aggregate 
Total Rising Stable Falling Uncertain 
Total 51 25 18 5 3 51 8 24 10 9 
Creditworthiness of the tenant 12.563 12.910 14.430 8.720 4.850 18.352 16.518 13.712 12.956 16.890 
Single or multi-let 11.336 13.250 9.410 9.980 9.220 5.570 5.730 5.296 7.456 6.482 
Rent review clause 12.094 11.230 12.280 13.490 15.850 8.857 6.849 10.244 12.679 9.563 
Period to expiry/break 8.473 9.170 8.470 4.850 8.720 9.132 7.408 7.639 9.400 4.271 
User/assignment clause 7.924 7.180 8.660 8.940 7.980 5.875 7.334 5.956 6.408 3.214 
Location 22.211 20.580 22.600 27.240 25.130 26.115 19.109 28.853 22.423 25.474 
BREEAM rating 8.309 8.090 7.920 10.390 8.950 13.182 15.616 13.557 15.724 28.982 
Economic and functional obsolescence 17.090 17.590 16.210 16.400 19.300 12.917 21.437 14.742 12.954 5.125 
Note: Highest average utilities (part-worths) are depicted in bold and lowest in italics, for ease of analysis. 
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Table 7: Attribute Levels, Segmented by Property Market Outlook, HB Estimation 
 2007 2016 
 
Aggregate 
Total Rising Stable Falling Uncertain 
Aggregate 
Total Rising Stable Falling Uncertain 
Total Respondents 51 25 18 5 3 51 8 24 10 9 
D&B 5AA rating for tenant(s) (Minimum risk of tenant default) 31.610 31.050 40.820 13.380 11.370 57.228 66.173 28.847 36.754 56.315 
D&B 3AA or 4AA rating for tenant(s) (Lower than average risk) 7.203 12.050 9.010 -6.040 -21.940 37.612 42.972 42.258 26.701 14.543 
D&B 1AA or 2AA rating for tenant(s) (Higher than average risk) 9.169 7.610 10.310 9.560 14.670 -24.083 -58.336 -26.898 -26.141 7.886 
D&B AA or BB or CC rating for tenant(s) (High risk of default) -1.776 -1.950 -7.130 15.000 3.820 -70.757 -50.809 -44.206 -37.315 -78.744 
D&B DD or lower rating for tenant(s)  -46.207 -48.770 -53.000 -31.900 -7.920      
Single let property -44.551 -51.890 -35.750 -39.830 -44.020 2.261 -3.477 2.153 -4.079 14.314 
2 to 5 tenants 13.857 14.710 13.650 9.720 14.840 -4.646 -16.633 -4.810 20.259 -5.401 
More than 5 tenants 30.694 37.180 22.100 30.100 29.180 2.386 20.110 2.657 -16.180 -8.913 
Rent set annually, linked to index or turnover 5.995 1.250 5.520 41.270 -10.390 13.939 22.947 1.467 36.253 -36.503 
Rent review every 2 to 3 years, upwards only clause 31.226 29.500 30.530 29.670 52.340 -1.180 -10.610 28.814 -45.510 -4.489 
Rent review every 4 or more years, upwards only clause 20.225 19.150 24.820 8.750 20.730 -2.764 -16.103 9.227 -4.626 -3.248 
Rent review every 2 to 3 years, no upwards only clause -30.386 -27.510 -33.320 -31.340 -35.120 2.993 -8.782 -17.140 23.810 17.380 
Rent review every 4 or more years, no upwards only clause -27.060 -22.390 -27.550 -48.350 -27.570 -12.988 12.546 -22.368 -9.927 26.860 
Less than 5 years to expiry/break  -23.464 -26.070 -28.620 -17.190 18.680 -24.297 -26.992 -22.477 -6.184 -1.867 
5 to 10 years to expiry/break  0.747 -0.860 2.160 2.310 3.090 0.013 -0.850 -2.382 -14.373 0.229 
Over 10 years to expiry/break  22.717 26.930 26.460 14.880 -21.770 24.284 27.842 24.859 20.557 1.638 
Restrictive user/assignment clause -25.488 -23.610 -30.710 -23.300 -13.470 -5.669 -33.744 -7.557 4.427 3.553 
Standard user/assignment clause 18.671 12.330 22.890 33.240 21.980 6.014 17.947 -4.197 15.030 -3.264 
Relaxed or no user/assignment clause 6.817 11.280 7.830 -9.930 -8.510 -0.345 15.797 11.754 -19.458 -0.288 
In town or city centre (prime pitch) 80.822 77.470 77.750 107.580 82.580 116.477 63.398 125.683 104.919 99.164 
In town or city centre (secondary pitch)      -18.006 -23.649 11.738 -18.205 -9.403 
Suburban, close to existing public transportation 28.924 25.050 30.780 28.610 50.610 45.733 50.409 23.169 51.604 73.629 
Suburban, no existing public transportation -63.649 -64.170 -51.580 -109.950 -54.510 -77.373 -80.482 -76.888 -40.815 -104.537 
Out of the town/city, close to existing public transportation 27.557 22.490 29.000 42.150 36.820 -2.965 48.061 -1.872 -32.097 -6.738 
Out of the town/city, no existing public transportation -73.654 -60.830 -85.950 -68.390 -115.510 -63.866 -57.737 -81.829 -65.406 -52.115 
BREEAM pass rating -4.298 -2.560 -10.480 12.280 -9.310 -47.168 20.380 -46.573 -54.921 -5.934 
BREEAM good rating -10.950 -12.360 -13.070 -0.960 -3.150 8.529 9.073 1.031 36.739 19.556 
BREEAM very good rating 20.525 22.620 13.680 30.950 26.730 21.980 35.906 29.062 14.598 30.736 
BREEAM excellent rating -7.299 -4.350 -0.070 -42.120 -17.230 27.216 8.024 0.550 17.208 83.441 
BREEAM rating: Outstanding      31.216 -0.438 35.423 18.026 20.460 
BREEAM rating not known 2.022 -3.350 9.930 -0.150 2.970 -41.773 -72.945 -19.493 -31.650 -148.261 
High specification and flexible internal configuration 61.817 63.760 56.710 64.860 71.160 41.139 52.634 58.934 35.669 0.483 
Average specification and internal configuration 8.237 12.700 3.270 1.470 12.120 12.474 52.347 -2.376 9.821 3.503 
Low specification and inflexible internal configuration -70.054 -76.460 -59.980 -66.320 -83.280 -53.612 -104.981 -56.558 -45.490 -3.986 
None 44.424 33.450 70.930 3.740 44.590 147.774 157.836 116.044 104.411 162.305 
Note: Highest average utilities (part-worths) are depicted in bold and lowest in italics, for ease of analysis. 
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APPENDIX  
Table 1A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics, January 1997 to December 2017, Raw Data  
 
Raw Real Data 
 
ADF Test  
 
Lag 
Length 
ADF Test  
 
Lag 
Length Levels Differenced 
EPU -2.156 
 
4 -9.343 * 3 
Real Total Return 
All Property (RPREM) -1.140 
 
2 -4.128 * 1 
Sector (RPsct):  Office -0.699 
 
1 -5.436 * 0 
Industrial 0.434 
 
2 -2.647 *** 1 
Retail -1.886 
 
2 -4.077 * 1 
Other 0.631 
 
2 -6.562 * 1 
Hotel# 1.358 
 
1 -9.485 * 0 
Leisure## -0.212 
 
2 -4.392 * 1 
Real Capital Growth  
All Property (RPREM) -1.395 
 
1 -4.857 * 0 
Sector (RPsct):  Office -1.597 
 
1 -5.162 * 0 
Industrial -1.717 
 
13 -3.070 ** 12 
Retail -2.362 
 
7 -4.816 * 0 
Other -1.329 
 
1 -10.154 * 1 
Hotel# -1.130 
 
1 -10.991 * 0 
Leisure## -1.453 
 
2 -5.122 * 1 
Real Income Return 
All Property (RPREM) -0.285 
 
13 -2.752 *** 12 
Sector (RPsct):  Office -1.231 
 
13 -2.639 *** 12 
Industrial -0.216 
 
13 -2.462 
 
12 
Retail 0.347 
 
13 -2.697 *** 12 
Other 0.110 
 
13 -2.971 ** 12 
Hotel# -2.515 
 
13 -2.368 
 
12 
Leisure## 0.750 
 
13 -2.438  12 
# August 2000 to December 2017; ## November 1998 to December 2017. 
* rejects null hypothesis that the time series contains unit root at 1% significance level; ** rejects the null hypothesis at 5% significance level. 
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Table A2: Unrestricted Bi-variate VAR Granger Causality Tests, January 1997 to December 2017, Raw Data 
Sector Chi-sq df 
 
Sector Chi-sq df  
All Property RAW DATA Other Property RAW DATA 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 28.807 12 * EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 3.164 5  
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 36.542 12 * Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 16.440 5 * 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 18.932 11 *** EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 1.302 5  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 14.314 11 
 
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 5.598 5  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 7.791 12 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 7.816 12  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 24.547 12 * Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 24.498 12 ** 
Office Property 
   
Hotel Property#    
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 30.475 12 * EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 1.436 5  
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 39.751 12 * Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 14.356 5 ** 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 15.929 7 ** EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 0.915 5  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 7.444 7 
 
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 4.784 5  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 7.827 12 
 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 7.223 12  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 23.615 12 ** Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 20.651 12 *** 
Industrial Property 
   
Leisure##    
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 35.944 12 * EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 8.698 5  
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 37.407 12 * Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 13.173 5 ** 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 14.737 9  EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 2.889 3  
Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 11.660 9  Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 1.990 3  
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 8.192 12  EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 7.239 12  
Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 26.233 12 ** Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 22.798 12 ** 
Retail Property 
   
    
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Total Return 25.678 11 * 
# - August 2000 to December 2017; ## - November 1998 to December 
2017. 
Real Total Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 22.446 11 ** *     rejects null hypothesis that the time series contains unit root at 1% 
significance level. 
**   rejects the null hypothesis at 5% significance level. 
*** rejects the null hypothesis at 10% significance level. 
EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Capital Growth 14.975 11 
 Real Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 11.084 11 
 EPU does not Granger-Cause Real Income Return 7.674 12 
 Real Income Return does not Granger-Cause EPU 24.589 12 ** 
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Table A3: Transaction-Linked Index, 1999Q1 to 2017Q4 Data 
 
Table A3.a: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 
 
ADF Test 
Statistic 
 
Lag 
Length 
ADF Test 
Statistic 
 
Lag 
Length Levels Differenced 
EPU -1.450 
 
0 -7.224 * 0 
All Property (RPREM) -1.567 
 
1 -6.245 * 0 
Sector (RPsct):  Office -1.379 
 
0 -7.267 * 0 
Industrial -1.181 
 
0 -7.687 * 0 
Retail -1.469 
 
1 -6.443 * 0 
 
Table A3.b: Unrestricted Bi-Variate VAR Granger Causality Tests 
 
Chi-sq df 
 All Property 
   EPU does not Granger-Cause Real TLI Capital Growth 8.359 1 * 
Real TLI Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 2.208 1 
 Office Property 
   EPU does not Granger-Cause Real TLI Capital Growth 7.056 1 * 
Real TLI Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 1.999 1 
 Industrial Property 
   EPU does not Granger-Cause Real TLI Capital Growth 12.870 3 * 
Real TLI Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 1.549 3 
 Retail Property 
   EPU does not Granger-Cause Real TLI Capital Growth 14.634 3 * 
Real TLI Capital Growth does not Granger-Cause EPU 2.273 3 
  
 
